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NOTE
ERGER V. ASKREN: PROTECTING THE




The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have
infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our
society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility.'
As Justice Stevens so eloquently stated, the structures of
family relationships extend across the spectrum, and those struc-
tures are constantly transforming. The changing composition of
the American family continually presents the courts with new
situations and issues that challenge existing laws, precedent,
and societal norms. In an attempt to address the steady increase
in the number of stepfamilies, and the issues they raise, the
1979 Montana Legislature enacted section 40-4-221 of the Mon-
tana Code.2
This statute provides the stepparent with the right to re-
quest a custody hearing after the death of the custodial parent.3
The statute also provides that the custody dispute must be re-
solved according to the best interest of the child.4 The statute,
as drafted by the legislature, attempts to balance the constitu-
tional rights of all the parties involved after the death of a custo-
dial parent-the child, stepparent, and mother or father.
1. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983).
2. See Ch. 127, H.B. 335, 46th Leg. Sess. (Mont. 1979) (Statements of Repre-
sentative Ramirez).
3. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221(I),(2)(b) (1995).
4. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1), 40-4-221(3) (1995).
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However, in the case of Erger v. Askren,5 the Montana Su-
preme Court found this statute upconstitutional to the extent it
infringes upon the rights of the natural parent who has not been
adjudicated "unfit."' This note reviews the reasoning of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court in the Erger v. Askren opinion. It focuses on
the court's analysis and supplements it with a discussion of all
the parties' constitutional rights. Part II summarizes the Mon-
tana Supreme Court's opinion in Erger v. Askren. Part III ex-
plains the historical analysis and development of the rights be-
longing to the biological parents, the stepparent, and the child.
Part IV illustrates how the best interest of the child standard
attempts to balance these sometimes conflicting rights to protect
the constitutional rights of all the parties and suggests that the
analysis of the Montana Supreme Court was not complete. Part
V analyzes the effects of this decision. Part VI concludes that the
rights of the natural parent must be balanced against the rights
of the child and the stepparent.
II. ERGER V. ASKREN
A. Summary of Facts
A.R.A. was born in 1987, four years after Tracy Erger and
Bill Askren, her parents, were married.7 Soon after the birth of
their child, Tracy and Bill experienced marital difficulties, culmi-
nating in physical violence.8 Tracy's coworkers noticed on more
than one occasion that her face was bruised and that she wore
sunglasses while working.' In January of 1988, Bill was charged
with assault after striking Tracy.' ° He was ordered to attend an
anger management class and although he attended some of the
sessions, he did not complete the course."
Tracy and Bill reconciled, but shortly thereafter Bill's violent
behavior resurfaced.'2 When Bill assaulted Tracy once again,
Tracy and her daughter fled their home and sought shelter at a
safe house. 3 Bill and Tracy separated permanently after this
5. 277 Mont. 66, 919 P.2d 388 (1996).
6. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 71, 919 P.2d at 392.
7. See id. at 68, 919 P.2d at 389.
8. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order at 2-3, In re the
Custody of A.RA., No. DR 92-1200 (13th Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Aug. 10, 1994).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 3.
12. See id.
13. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order at 3, In re the
[Vol. 58
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final incident. 4 At this time, A.R.A. was approximately eigh-
teen months old.
Bill and Tracy were divorced in 1989."5 In the divorce de-
cree, Tracy was awarded sole custody of A.R.A., and Bill was
given reasonable rights of visitation and ordered to pay child
support in the amount of $200 per month. 6 Bill moved to Salt
Lake City and consequently did not exercise his visitation rights
with the exception of telephone calls and yearly visits.17 Bill
also failed to pay approximately $4,000 in court ordered child
support. 8
Tracy married Patrick Erger, the Petitioner, in 1990."9 In
February of 1992, Tracy and Patrick had a child, Joshua Joseph
Erger.20 Ten months later, Tracy was killed in an airplane
crash when she was returning home from a business trip.2' In
her will, she designated Patrick as A.R.A.'s guardian.22
The day after Tracy's death, Bill traveled to Patrick's resi-
dence to take A.R.A., but Patrick refused to relinquish physical
custody of her.2' Patrick, as the guardian nominated in Tracy's
will, filed an action in district court seeking custody of A.R.A.
pursuant to section 40-4-221(2)(b)(c) of the Montana Code.24 The
district court heard the case and determined that Patrick was
Custody of A.RA., No. DR 92-1200 (13th Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Aug. 10, 1994).
14. See id.
15. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 68, 919 P.2d at 389.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order at 5, In re the
Custody of A.R.A., No. DR 92-1200 (13th Dist. Ct. Mont. fied Aug. 10, 1994).
19. See id. at 4.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 4-5.
22. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 68, 919 P.2d at 390.
23. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order at 5, In re Custody
of A.R.A., No. DR 92-1200 (13th Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Aug. 10, 1994).
24. See id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221 (1995) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Upon the death of a parent granted custody of a child, custody shall
pass to the noncustodial parent unless one or more parties named in sub-
section (2) request a custody hearing. The noncustodial parent shall be a
party in any proceeding brought under this section.
(2) Upon the death of a parent granted custody of a child, any of the fol-
lowing parties may request a custody hearing and seek custody of the child:
(b) the surviving spouse of the deceased custodial parent;
(c) a person nominated by the will of the deceased custodial parent;
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the appropriate person to have custody of A.R.A.2" The court's
decision was supported by Jeannie Atkinson, a psychotherapist
providing grief counseling to A.R.A., who testified that A.R.A.
perceived Patrick and Joshua as her primary family.26 The dis-
trict court based its custody determination on the best interest of
A.R.A.,27 and it is from this determination that Bill appealed
the case to the Montana Supreme Court.2"
B. Holding of the Montana Supreme Court
On appeal, Bill alleged that the district court's use of the
best interest test violated his constitutional right as the natural
father.29 The issue presented to the Montana Supreme Court
was whether the district court applied the correct standard to
determine custody in a dispute between a biological parent and a
third party.3" The Montana Supreme Court held that the best
interest of the child standard did not adequately protect the con-
stitutional rights of the natural father.31 The court instead
found that the natural father's right to raise his child must be
25. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 68, 919 P.2d at 390.
26. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order at 6, In re the
Custody of A.R-A, No. DR 92-1200 (13th Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Aug. 10, 1994).
27. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1995) which sets forth the following
factors and presumptions as relevant to determining the child's best interest:
(a) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
(b) the wishes of the child as to a custodian;
(c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parent
or parents and siblings and with any other person who may significantly
affect the child's best interest;
(d) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(e) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(f) physical abuse or threat of physical abuse by one parent against the
other parent or the child; and
(g) chemical dependency, as defined in 53-24-103, or chemical abuse on the
part of either parent.
(3) The following are rebuttable presumptions and apply unless contrary to
the best interest of the child:
(a) Custody should be granted to the parent who has provided most of the
primary care during the child's life.
(4) The following are rebuttable presumptions:
(b) Failure to pay child support that the person is able to pay is not in the
best interest of a child in need of support.
28. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 68, 919 P.2d at 390.
29. See id. at 70, 919 P.2d at 391.
30. See id. at 68, 919 P.2d at 390.
31. See id. at 71-72, 919 P.2d at 392.
4
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protected by requiring a finding of abuse, neglect or dependency
prior to awarding custody to a third party.
32
In Erger, the court cited In re Guardianship of Doney, a case
relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, to find that
natural parents have a constitutional right to parent their chil-
dren.' The Montana Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of
the United States Supreme Court, which found protection of pa-
rental rights and the integrity of the family unit under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,3' in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and in the
Ninth Amendment." Additionally, the court stated that "[t]he
careful protection of parental rights is not merely a matter of
legislative grace, but is constitutionally required."3' The court
indicated that it must construe the statute governing custody
disputes after the death of a custodial parent to ensure preserva-
tion of the constitutional rights of the parties.38
Consequently, the court protected the state's ability to inter-
fere with the private relationships within a family. 39 The court
relied heavily on the holdings of other courts that require a find-
ing of abuse, neglect, or dependency as a prerequisite to any
court-ordered transfer of custody from a natural parent to a third
party. 40 To the extent that section 40-4-221 of the Montana
Code allows a third party to obtain custody of a child prior to
terminating the natural parent's rights, the Montana Supreme
Court found it to be unconstitutional.4'
Upon reaching its holding, the court was forced to overrule
two Montana cases that applied the best interest of the child test
32. See id.
33. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 70, 919 P.2d at 391 (citing In re Guardianship of
Doney, 174 Mont. 282, 286, 570 P.2d 575, 577 (1977) (citations omitted)).
34. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 70, 919 P.2d at 391 (quoting Doney, 174 Mont. at
286, 570 P.2d at 577 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972))).
35. See id. (quoting Doney, 174 Mont. at 286, 570 P.2d at 577 (quoting Stanley,
405 U.S. at 651)).
36. See id. (quoting Doney, 174 Mont. at 286, 570 P.2d at 577 (quoting Stanley,
405 U.S. at 651)).
37. See id. (quoting Doney, 174 Mont. at 286, 570 P.2d at 577 (citing Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
38. See id. (citing LaFountaine v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 215 Mont. 402,
406-07, 698 P.2d 410, 413 (1985)).
39. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 71, 919 P.2d at 391 (citing Schultz v. Schultz, 184
Mont. 245, 247, 602 P.2d 595, 596 (1979); Doney, 174 Mont. at 285-86, 570 P.2d at
577)).
40. See id. (quoting Babcock v. Wonnacott, 268 Mont. 149, 152, 885 P.2d 522,
524 (1994)).
41. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 72, 919 P.2d at 392.
1997] 603
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in awarding custody to a nonparent over a natural parent with-
out a finding of abuse, neglect or dependency.42 In Brost v. Glas-
gow,' the court applied the best interest of the child standard
after the mother's death to award custody to the children's ma-
ternal grandmother and not the childrens' natural father." In
the case of In re Paternity of C.G.," the court was faced with
two men who both sincerely believed that they were the child's
father and who both wished to have custody of the child follow-
ing the mother's death.' Blood tests conclusively proved that
the man who had been living with the child was not the child's
natural father.47 The court refused to require the more strin-
gent standard of abuse, neglect or dependency and instead ap-
plied the best interest of the child standard when making its
custody determination.'
The court justified overruling the above two cases primarily
by relying on its holding in In re Guardianship of Doney,4' a
case involving the termination of parental rights." In that case
the Montana Supreme Court emphasized the importance of pro-
tecting a parent's constitutional right to retain custody of his or
her child. The court held that to protect the parent's rights, the
state must carefully follow the procedures set forth by the legis-
lature, and the court must make specific findings of fact prior to
removing the child from the natural parent's custody.5'
The Montana Supreme Court concluded its opinion in Erger
by acknowledging that section 40-4-221 of the Montana Code
still provides stepparents with the necessary standing to request
a custody hearing." However, courts may no longer rely upon
section 40-4-221(3) of the Montana Code in making a determina-
tion of custody between a parent and a third party.53 The court
altered the proper standard for making a custody determination
under this statute by construing it to require a two step process:
42. See id. (overruling Brost v. Glasgow, 200 Mont. 194, 651 P.2d 32 (1982) and
In re Paternity of C.G., 228 Mont. 118, 740 P.2d 1139 (1987)).
43. 200 Mont. 194, 651 P.2d 32 (1982).
44. See id.
45. 228 Mont. 118, 740 P.2d 1139 (1987).
46. See id. at 120, 740 P.2d at 1140.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 121, 740 P.2d at 1141.
49. 174 Mont. 282, 570 P.2d 575 (1977).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 285, 570 P.2d at 577.
52. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 72, 919 P.2d 388 at 392.
53. See id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221(3) (1995) (providing that the custody
determination should be based on the best interest of the child).
604 [Vol. 58
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first, the court must determine whether parental rights were lost
by termination, death, or any other statute that provides for the
forfeiture, relinquishment or abandonment of parental rights;
and second, if parental rights were in fact lost, then the court
must make a determination of custody based on the best interest
of the child. 5' Accordingly, the decision of the district court was
reversed and custody of A.R.A. was awarded to Bill, her natural
father.55
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RIGHTS AT ISSUE IN CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS
A. The Rights of Biological Parents
1. Privacy Rights
The Montana Supreme Court has not yet addressed the right
to privacy, as enumerated in the Montana Constitution,5" within
the context of familial relationships. However, within the federal
constitutional right to privacy, the United States Supreme Court
has found a fundamental liberty interest in the privacy of family
affairs.57 Montana has relied on the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of privacy to interpret its own privacy clause
in the context of familial relationships.5"
Although neither the right to privacy nor the more general
liberty interest in having a family is enumerated in the United
States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has
protected both of these fundamental rights.59 The United States
Supreme Court has also held that the right to privacy includes
general liberty interests, such as freedom of choice in marital
decisions," reproduction,6 and child rearing.62 The protection
54. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 74, 919 P.2d at 393 (Nelson, J., concurring).
55. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 73, 919 P.2d at 392.
56. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
57. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972):
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companion-
ship, care, custody, and management of his or her children "come(s) to this
Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties
which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements."
Id. (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
58. See Town of Ennis v. Stewart, 247 Mont. 355, 359, 807 P.2d 179, 182 (1991).
59. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7 at
403-04 (5th ed. 1995).
60. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
61. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
1997] 605
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of parental rights as fundamental rights arose out of the general
principle that parents have a liberty interest in ongoing rela-
tionships with their children' and that individual family mem-
bers are entitled to privacy within the family unit."
2. Due Process Rights65
Due process safeguards apply whenever the state attempts to
burden an individual's exercise of fundamental constitutional
rights."' Therefore, a due process analysis must be applied when
the state attempts to infringe upon the right of privacy or upon
the autonomy of the family. However, the analysis employed
differs according to the role of the parent within the family unit.
The constitutional protection afforded a mother's rights differs
from the constitutional protection provided to a father. Because
the mother carries the child and is easily recognizable as the
child's parent, her constitutional rights to care for her child and
make child rearing decisions arise automatically. 7 However, as
a prerequisite to finding that a father has constitutional rights as
a parent, he must establish proof of both a biological link and his
453 (1972).
62. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
63. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
64. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
65. The substantive due process protection provided to fathers' constitutional
rights is grounded in a long line of United States Supreme Court cases recognizing the
importance of the family. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
The rights to conceive and to raise one's own children have been deemed
"essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citations omitted);
"basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(citations omitted); and "(r)ights far more precious. .. than property rights,"
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (citations omitted). "It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citations omitted).
Id.
66. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 59, § 13.4 at 527-28.
67. This freedom to make child rearing decisions seems to extend to the right of
a mother to designate a guardian for her children in her will, as Tracy Erger did.
Erger v. Askren, 277 Mont. 66, 68, 919 P.2d 388, 390 (1996). "Freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is one of the liberties protected by due process."
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur,
414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)). However, the Montana Supreme Court did not discuss
the issue of whether the natural mother also has constitutional rights in need of
protection by the court. See Erger v. Askren, 277 Mont. 66, 919 P.2d 388 (1996).
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acceptance of parental responsibilities."
Stanley v. Illinois69 was the first case to analyze the substan-
tive due process rights afforded to biological fathers.70 In Illinois,
married fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived of their
children absent a finding that they were "unfit"; however, unwed
fathers were afforded no such protection.71 Stanley filed suit
alleging that he had been deprived of equal protection because of
his status as an unwed father.72 The United States Supreme
Court agreed that he was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a
parent before the state could take action to remove his children
from his home.73 Thus, the Court found that Stanley and all
unwed fathers have a substantial and cognizable interest in
retaining custody of their children.74
The Court's recognition of Stanley's constitutional rights as an
unwed father and the Court's finding that the statute at issue did
not further any state interest led the Court to conclude that the
statute impermissibly infringed on Stanley's constitutional
rights.75 The Court held that Stanley was entitled to the same
protection that married parents and unwed mothers were afforded
in Illinois; specifically, a hearing on his "fitness" as a parent prior
to removing the children from his home.78
Questions remain as to the exact implications of the holding
in Stanley v. Illinois. Some courts have found that Stanley
establishes a constitutional requirement that a parent be found
"unfit" prior to denying that parent custody of his or her child.
77
However, commentators argue that Stanley merely forbids
termination of parental rights based on a presumption that a class
of parents is unfit.7 What is clear is that fathers have due
process rights that must be considered by the courts.
68. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979).
69. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 648.
72. See id. at 646.
73. See id. at 645.
74. See id. at 652.
75. See id. at 649.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121, 1126-27 (Kan. 1981).
78. See, e.g., David L. Nersessian, Mom Versus Grandma-or-Grandparent Prefer-
ence Versus Best Interest: An Examination of the Case for Grandparent Custody, 13
PROB. L.J. 133, 137 (1996).
1997] 607
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B. The Rights of Stepparents
Although the rights of natural parents have been protected as
fundamental rights, courts generally have not recognized steppar-
ents as a group possessing constitutional rights. "[T]he legal
system favors the placement of children with one or both parents,
and third parties typically face a difficult burden in overcoming
this parental preference."79 However, this burden is not insur-
mountable because as society's concept of parenting and family
change, so does the recognition of the corresponding rights.
Professor Margaret M. Mahoney cites the 1990 census, which
estimated that "approximately 5.5 million married-couple house-
holds contained at least one stepchild under age eighteen. This
number constituted twenty-nine percent of all married-couple
households with children. The total number of stepchildren
residing in these families was 7,208,000. " "0 These statistics are
a reflection of the changes that are occurring in what we, as a
society, perceive as the traditional nuclear family. "The reality
today is that many children do not grow up in the traditional
construct of a family-two natural parents, a full sibling or two,
a dog, a cat, and a minivan." "
However, courts still prefer biological links over the psycholog-
ical links that may bind individuals together as a family. "Genetic
parentage... enjoys an historic advantage in the ancient tradition
of patriarchal ownership of children. Rights attaching to genetic
paternity tap into a tradition as old as Genesis and Aristotle." 2
Stepparents typically act in loco parentis.83 Where, as in
stepfamilies, the natural father's parental opportunity conflicts
with the similar opportunity of the stepfather, it is not unconstitu-
tional to give preference to the latter.8" The Court has found that
resolution of these conflicting rights is best left to the legisla-
ture.'
79. MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 124 (1994).
80. MAHONEY, supra note 79, at 2, (citing Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Current Population Rep., Special Studies Series P23-180, Marriage, Divorce
and Remarriage in the 1990's, Table L, at 10 (Oct. 1992)).
81. Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together
Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045, 1052 (1996).
82. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective
On Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1777 (1993).
83. See MAHONEY, supra note 79, at 124. In loco parentis is a Latin term which
means "in the place of a parent." Id. at 7.
84. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (relying on the
language from Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983)).
85. The Court found that the following issue was a question of legislative policy
[Vol. 58
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When the individual fulfills the role and the duties of a
parent, some courts recognize this individual as the "parent" of the
child with the rights that attach by virtue of parenthood.'
However, in the context of foster families, the Court held that
third parties only have rights derivative of the child's best
interest.87 When the rights of the third party and the best
interest of the child conflict with the rights of the natural parent,
the Constitution may not require the state to protect the biological
relationship with any process greater than the best interest stan-
dard.' Whether it is a foster parent or a stepparent, the third
party's liberty interests are recognized at least to the extent that
they further the best interest of the child.
C. The Rights of Children
1. Privacy Rights
Children in Montana have substantially the same privacy
rights as adults.8 9 Consequently, the privacy rights of children as
members of a family unit merit individual recognition. As
discussed previously, the definition of family usually implies a
biological relationship, but biology is not the exclusive deter-
and not constitutional law: Can the presumed parenthood of a couple desiring to retain
a child born into their marriage trump the biological father's right to rebut the
presumption? See id. at 129-30.
86. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
87. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 861 (1977) (citing
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 (N.Y. 1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). It has
been suggested that the analysis of foster parent's rights applies to stepparents as well.
However, the intent to create a permanent family distinguishes a stepparent from a
foster parent or any other temporary caretaker. A child in a stepfamily may have no
expectation that he or she will ever return to live with the noncustodial parent. See
Kaas, supra note 81, at 1099. Conversely, the placement of a child in a foster family
is treated as temporary, and the best interest of the child is to leave the foster system
and return to a permanent home. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 861-62.
88. See Kaas, supra note 81, at 1089 (concluding that the Constitution would
permit application of a best interest of the child test in a child custody dispute
between the child's stepparent and the child's natural parent); Suzette M. Haynie,
Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody Is Constitution-
ally Protected?, 20 GA_ L. REv. 705, 736 (1986) (concluding that undue emphasis on
biology is unconstitutional); but see Sheppard, 630 P.2d at 1128 (holding that
application of the best interest test prior to terminating parental rights is unconstitu-
tional).
89. See MONT. CONST. art. II, §15. "The rights of persons under 18 years of age
shall include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless
specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such persons." Id.; see
also Matthew B. Hayhurst, Parental Notification of Abortion and Minors' Rights Under
the Montana Constitution, 58 MONT. L. REv. 565, 575-78 (1997).
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mination of what constitutes a family.9" The importance of family
"stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the
intimacy of daily association ... .", Unlike adults, young chil-
dren have no psychological conception of relationships by blood-
ties;92 conversely, a child's perception of a parent is shaped by his
or her day-to-day needs. 3 This relationship, not the biological
relationship, merits protection under the privacy and the minor
rights clauses of the Montana Constitution.
2. Liberty Interest and Other Basic Human Rights
United States Supreme Court precedent indicates that a child
may also have a liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with
a person who meets the child's needs and best interests. 4 In
Michael H. v. Gerald D.," the Court recognized a child's interest
in maintaining a relationship with her presumed father, the man
with whom she had been living in a stable family environment.
Conversely, the Court refused to recognize that she had a liberty
interest in maintaining a filial relationship with her natural
father.9 The court also refused to acknowledge that she had any
right to maintain filial relationships with both her biological father
and her presumed father. The decision of the Supreme Court
recognized the custodial mother's ability to determine that the best
interests of her daughter would be served by not allowing the
biological father visitation rights.9 Thus, a child has a liberty
interest in maintaining relationships with those persons who serve
the best interests of the child.
In addition to the United States Supreme Court's decision
holding that children have privacy and liberty interests, the
Montana Supreme Court has recognized that children are entitled
90. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 843.
91. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844.
92. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
12 (rev. ed. 1979).
93. See James B. Boskey, The Swamps of Home: A Reconstruction of the Parent-
Child Relationship, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 805, 808 (1995) (citing Gilbert A. Holmes, The
Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Rights of Children to Maintain Relationships With
Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358 (1994)).
94. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
95. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
96. See id. at 129.
97. See id. at 130-31.
98. See id. at 131-32. The Supreme Court stated that there was nothing
fundamentally unfair about the district court judge's exercise of discretion which
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to additional rights. The Montana Supreme Court held that
children enjoy "the basic human right to maintain and enjoy the
relationship which normally exists between parents and chil-
dren."9 The court reasoned that inalienable rights, as guaranteed
by the Declaration of Rights in the Montana Constitution, include
"basic human rights.""° Because inalienable rights are found in
the Declaration of Rights, they are classified as fundamental
rights.'' By recognizing that children have a fundamental right
to enjoy normal family relationships, the court also guaranteed
constitutional protection of this right and, therefore, children may
not be deprived of due process in any custody proceeding."° In
Gullette, the court held that it would be a violation of a child's due
process rights to change a child's custody arrangement without
presenting the child's best interests to the court.'0 3
Independent counsel is required not only to advocate the
child's position, but also to ensure that there is a complete and
accurate record upon which the court may rely. " Thus, indepen-
dent counsel must ensure that the child is protected and that the
best interests of the child are presented to the court completely
and accurately.0 5 Accordingly, failing to consider the best inter-
ests of the child in any custody dispute would violate the child's
fundamental rights as well as the child's due process rights.
IV. ANALYSIS: THE COURT'S DEPARTURE FROM BALANCING THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AGAINST THE RIGHTS OF THE BIOLOGICAL
PARENT
99. In re Guardianship of Gullette, 173 Mont. 132, 138, 566 P.2d 396, 399 (1977)
(citations omitted).
100. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. This section states:
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include
the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing
life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health
and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons
recognize corresponding responsibilities.
Id.
101. See Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309,
1311-13 (1986).
102. See Gullette, 173 Mont. at 138, 566 P.2d at 399 (citations omitted).
103. See id. at 139, 566 P.2d at 399.
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A. Best Interest of the Child Standard
The best interest of the child standard focuses the court
primarily on the needs of the child when resolving custody
disputes. Although application of this standard has gained general
acceptance in custody disputes between two natural parents, it has
not been widely employed in third party custody disputes."° This
is because there is some disagreement as to whether or not a
custody determination in favor of a third person, based on the best
interest of the child, violates the due process rights of the natural
parent.
In Quilloin v. Walcott, °" the United States Supreme Court
held that a natural father's substantive rights under the due
process clause were not violated by application of the "best interest
of the child" standard."° In that case, the natural father at-
tempted to block the child's stepfather from adopting the child."°
The natural father had provided only sporadic support, contact,
and gifts to the child over the previous eleven years."' The Court
did not find that the father had abused, neglected or abandoned
his child prior to terminating his rights as a parent."'
The Court reiterated its prior holdings, which required that
constitutional protection must be provided to the relationship
between a parent and a child."' Specifically, the forced breakup
of a natural family based solely on the best interest of the child
test would offend the due process clause."' However, the court
noted that the due process clause is not offended by the applica-
tion of the best interest test to recognize a family unit already in
106. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987). The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act has been adopted in nine states. See id. at 147.
Section 402 of the uniform act, which was designed to codify existing law, requires
courts to make custody determinations based on the best interests of the child. See id.
at 561. Section 402 has been interpreted as applying to all custody disputes, and it has
been interpreted as applying only to custody disputes between two natural parents.
Compare In re Custody of Henkins, 453 N.E.2d 78 (1983) (applying the best interest
standard to a third party custody dispute) with Henderson v. Henderson, 177 Mont.
1, 568 P.2d 177 (1977) (holding that custody could not be awarded to a nonparent as
against the natural parent based on the best interest of a child).
107. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
108. See id. at 254.
109. See id. at 247.
110. See id. at 250-51.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 255 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Stanley
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existence.1 In Quilloin, the Court applied the best interest of
the child test to permit the stepfather, with whom the child had
been living for six years, to adopt her despite her natural father's
objections and the absence of a finding of abuse, neglect or
dependency."5 The Court protected the due process rights of the
natural father by affording him a hearing at which he had the
opportunity to offer evidence on any matter he thought relevant,
including his ability as a parent."' Thus, to adequately protect
the due process rights of the natural parent, the law in Montana
must provide a similar opportunity.
The best interest test in section 40-4-221 of the Montana Code
provides similar, if not additional, protection for the natural
father's constitutional rights. First, the statute requires that the
custodial parent be included as a party in any custody proceeding
brought under that statute."7 Second, the statute requires that
the custody dispute be resolved according to the best interest of
the child."8 The natural parent is given the opportunity to
present evidence on any matter that he or she finds relevant,
including his or her wishes regarding custody." Section 40-4-
212 of the Montana Code was designed to codify the existing law,
including the presumption that a custody determination favoring
the natural parent is preferred to awarding custody to a third
party." Additionally, studies have found that subsequent to a
best interest of the child standard being adopted, the likelihood
that the biological parent will be awarded custody of his or her
own child over a third party has increased.''
Section 40-4-221 of the Montana Code was adopted to provide
the court flexibility in determining if it is in the child's best inter-
est to return to the custody of the natural parent after the death
of the custodial parent. The judiciary committee was partic-
ularly concerned with situations in which the child had minimal
114. See id.
115. See id. at 254-55.
116. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254.
117. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221(1) (1995).
118. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221(3), 40-4-212 (1995).
119. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1995).
120. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (Commissioners' Note in Annotations) (1995).
121. In 1920, 15% of the children involved in custody disputes were placed with
a nonparent. Compare to 1990, when only 3.8% of the children involved in custody
disputes were placed with a nonparent. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED
STATES 134 (1994).
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or even no contact with the natural parent, but had developed a
close relationship with the stepparent."= The legislature appears
to have intended to allow the child to remain in the stepparent's
home even absent a finding of abuse or neglect.
B. The Montana Supreme Court's Incomplete Consideration
In Erger v. Askren, 24 the court did not address the
rights of the child. Instead, the court focussed exclusively on the
rights of the natural parent.' Based on the court's limited
inquiry, it found section 40-4-221 of the Montana Code unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it considered the best interests of the
child. This decision failed to evaluate the fundamental rights of all
of the parties. Consequently, it did not consider that balancing the
parties' rights may have justified an infringement upon the
father's rights."5
Section 40-4-212 of the Montana Code weighs a number of
relevant factors that consider both the child's best interests and
the level of responsibility assumed by the natural parent. The
statute is constitutional as it was narrowly drafted, thus allowing
infringement upon the natural parent's rights only in very limited
circumstances and only to the extent necessary to protect the
child's rights.
1. The Rights of the Biological Parent
In Erger v. Askren, the Montana Supreme Court found that
section 40-4-221 of the Montana Code is not constitutional because
it unduly infringes upon the fundamental rights of the natural
parent.1 27 However, the court's analysis of the natural parent's
rights neither proceeded through the proper inquiry nor considered
all of the relevant factors. First, the court did not articulate the
particular state interest against which the father's rights ought to
be weighed. Second, the court did not distinguish between cases
involving the removal of a child from the natural parents and
cases involving a reunification of the child with the natural parent
and, as a result, failed to note the father's reduced privacy interest
in reunification cases. Third, the court did not evaluate the
123. See Ch. 127, H.B. 335, 46th Leg. Sess. (Mont. 1979) (Statement of Repre-
sentative Ramirez).
124. 277 Mont. 66, 919 P.2d 388 (1996).
125. See id.
126. Note that the court did not address the rights of third parties either.
127. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 71-72, 919 P.2d at 392.
[Vol. 58614
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father's rights according to his assumption of parental responsibili-
ty. Finally, the court's analysis of the natural father's rights was
based on cases involving the termination of parental rights and
not cases involving custody disputes. Consequently, the increased
burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases was
wrongly employed in this custody dispute.
a. Compelling State Interest
There are three general approaches to identifying a compelling
state interest in statutes that infringe upon the rights of the
natural parent to protect the rights of the child. First, there is a
general interest in ensuring that children maintain meaningful
relationships, as stability and continuity in relationships build a
healthy psyche in children.' Second, the state has a compelling
interest in the welfare of children.' Third, some courts have
held that the states have an interest in protecting the best interest
of the child. 30 Furthermore, the state occupies the role of parens
patriae and, as such, can supervise the welfare of children to
promote their best interests. 3' Therefore, the state is responsible
for ensuring that the needs of children are met when addressing
issues of parental rights.'32 Protecting the well-being of children
is the compelling interest that justifies infringing upon the natural
parent's rights when those rights conflict with the child's best
interests.
Montana has affirmatively stated its policy of protecting
children in the introduction to the chapter on child abuse and
neglect in the Montana Code."3 It is the policy of the state of
Montana to "ensure that all youth are afforded an adequate
physical and emotional environment to promote normal develop-
ment" and to "provide for the protection of children whose health
and welfare are or may be adversely affected," while at the same
time protecting family unity.'34 Therefore, it is essential that the
128. See, e.g., Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1148-49 (Wyo. 1995) (citing
Lehrer v. Davis, 571 A.2d 691, 695 (Conn. 1990)).
129. See id. at 1149 (citing Sketo v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990)). "In Montana numerous statutes and cases have held the state has an active
and continuing interest in the welfare of children." In re Guardianship of Gullette, 173
Mont. 132, 140, 566 P.2d 396, 400 (1977).
130. See Michael, 900 P.2d at 1149 (citing Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989)).
131. See id. at 1150.
132. See Boskey, supra note 93, at 812-13.
133. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-101 (1995).
134. See MONT. CODE ANN. §41-3-101(1)(a), (2Xa), (2)(b) (1995).
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state limit infringement on family privacy and interfere only to the
extent necessary to protect the child.
b. Removal Versus Reunification
In Erger, the court was not faced with the issue of preventing
the disruption of an intact biological family unit. Instead, the court
was faced with the issue of whether to disrupt the stepfamily to
reunite A.R.A. with her natural father. The Montana Supreme
Court failed to recognize or address the distinction between cases
involving the removal of a child from the natural parent's home
and cases involving the reunification of a child with the natural
parent." The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that
privacy is typically thought of in terms of freedom from state
interference.13 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court spoke in terms of
Stanley's "interest in retaining custody of his children," and the
issue at stake was "the dismemberment of his family."13 7 This
language indicates that the Court resolved the issues in Stanley
by focusing on removal and not reunification. Therefore, one may
infer that the level of protection provided to Stanley need not be
provided to a natural parent in a reunification case. While the
privacy interests of a natural parent are of primary importance in
a removal case, they may be of diminished value in a reunification
case in which state intervention is not an issue.
c. Parental Responsibility
The United States Supreme Court has also asserted that the
state has a "paramount interest in the welfare of children" and
that the rights of the parent are protected in relation to the
parent's assumption of parental responsibilities." Although the
state's interest in protecting the welfare of the child remains
constant, the state's interest in protecting the rights of the parent
may fluctuate.'39 Thus, in balancing the rights of the parties, the
135. See generally Kaas, supra note 81 (distinguishing between removal and reuni-
fication cases in third party custody disputes and identifying the unique issues involved
in each case).
136. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 434 (1981) (stating that the right to privacy guards against unwarranted
state intervention); Montana v. Hyem, 193 Mont. 51, 630 P.2d 202 (1981) (stating that
the right to privacy is the right to be let alone).
137. 405 U.S. 645, 652, 658 (1972).
138. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983).
139. The best interest of the child standard takes into account, among other
things, the natural parent's relationship with the child and financial support provided
616 [Vol. 58
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state must evaluate the natural parent's fulfillment of his or her
parental obligations and the needs of the child before making any
custody determination. The Montana Supreme Court did not
evaluate Bill's fulfillment of his parental responsibilities, nor did
it take into account the district court's findings regarding this is-
sue.
d. Custody Proceedings Versus Termination Proceedings
Both the Montana Supreme Court' ° and the United States
Supreme Court.. have distinguished custody proceedings from
proceedings terminating parental rights. The standard for
infringing upon the natural parent's rights is lower in a custody
proceeding. This distinction seems lost in the Erger v. Askren
opinion. In Erger, the court relied heavily on In re Guardianship
of Doney, a case involving the termination of parental rights."'
In that case, the court required a showing of abuse, neglect, or
dependency prior to terminating the natural father's rights as
guardian of his two children.'" The level of protection afforded
a natural parent in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must
be higher than the level of protection afforded in a custody
dispute, because the implications of terminated parental rights are
so severe. The court in In re Custody of C.C.R.S. rejected the natu-
ral parent's assertion that she had a substantive custodial right to
the child and found instead that the parent would only enjoy the
increased procedural protection during a termination proceed-
ing.14
The Montana Supreme Court's opinion in Erger recognized the
importance of the natural parent's due process and privacy rights
that attach by virtue of parenthood. However, the court did not
by the natural parent, both indications of the parent's assumption of responsibility for
the child. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1995).
140. See Brost v. Glasgow, 200 Mont. 194, 198-99, 651 P.2d 32, 34 (1982) (applying
the best interest of the child standard and not the more stringent standards set forth
in prior cases involving termination of parental rights); In re Paternity of C.G., 228
Mont. 118, 121, 740 P.2d 1139, 1141 (1987) (in accord with the above holding in Brost).
141. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648-49 (1972) (distinguishing the level
of cause required for terminating custody as compared to a neglect proceeding).
142. See generally In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1995) (holding
that the best interest of the child standard is the proper consideration in a custody
dispute, not "unfitness" as in a termination of parental rights case).
143. 174 Mont. 282, 570 P.2d 575 (1977).
144. See id. at 285-86, 570 P.2d at 577.
145. 892 P.2d 246, 255 (Colo. 1995) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982) as it interprets Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
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examine whether the natural parent's rights could be infringed
upon in this particular situation. In Erger, the rights of the
natural father should have been balanced against A.R.A.'s rights,
the stepparent's rights and the compelling state interest in
A.R.A.'s welfare.
2. The Rights of the Stepparent
The court in Erger did not analyze the issue of whether
Patrick, the stepfather, had any constitutionally protected rights.
A stepparent who has established a parental relationship with his
or her stepchild is entitled to protection, even if that protection is
significantly less than the protection provided to a natural parent.
In Erger, the district court found that Patrick had excellent
parenting skills and had developed a strong emotional bond with
A.R.A.' " The court further held that a stepparent's rights to care
for his or her stepchild exist only to the extent that those rights
would further the best interests of the child.47 Using this stan-
dard, the district court found that it would be in A.R.A.'s best
interests to remain with her stepfather. In fact, the rights of the
stepparent, although limited, are similar to those of the natural
parent-they fluctuate according to responsibilities assumed by
the parental figure and the needs of the child.
Patrick had assumed the parental responsibilities necessary
to care for A.R.A. In contrast, Bill had neglected his responsibili-
ties as a parent by not exercising his visitation privileges and
becoming $4,000 delinquent on his child support payments." In
Erger, the rights fluctuated in such a way that the court could
have found that Patrick's rights should have priority over Bill's.
3. The Rights of the Children
Although children may have rights and interests that are not
compatible with those of the adults involved, these rights are
entitled to the same protection as those of adults.' When these
rights conflict, the state and the courts inevitably confront a
situation in which they must delicately balance the equally
fundamental rights of both parties. The overriding question is
146. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order at 7, In re Custody
of A-R.A., No. DR 92-1200 (13th Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Aug. 10, 1994).
147. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
148. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 68, 919 P.2d at 389.
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whether it is permissible to infringe upon the fundamental rights
of the parent based onthe best interest of the child. If the court
had analyzed the statute in this light, it may have found that this
statute was constitutional because: (1) it considers the best
interest of the child; and (2) it considers the abilities and past
performance of the natural parent."5
The compelling state interest in the welfare of children is also
determinative in deciding the constitutionality of a statute that
applies the best interest test, such as section 40-4-221 of the
Montana Code.' These particular state interests are especially
important in determining custody disputes after the death of a
custodial parent. It is at this time that the child's interest in
continuity and stability is most threatened because the child not
only suffers the traumatic death of a parent, but is also subject to
abrupt removal from his or her home.' Erger epitomized this
situation. The district court found that A.R.A. had a strong, stable
relationship with her stepfather and stepbrother, yet she only saw
her natural father once a year." The court also determined that
A.R.A. suffered from a learning disability, which made continuity
and consistency in her life even more important." The compel-
ling state interest in providing for her welfare was magnified after
the death of her mother and may have justified infringement on
the fundamental rights of her natural father.
Section 40-4-221 of the Montana Code was drafted to specifi-
cally and narrowly address the compelling state interest in the
welfare of a child after the death of the custodial parent. Further-
more, it provides the court with a means of balancing the rights of
the child against those of the natural parent.'5 This important
step in the analysis of constitutional rights was eliminated by the
Montana Supreme Court's decision that the statute was unconsti-
tutional. The court's analysis also appears to indicate that when
the constitutional rights of a child and a natural parent conflict,
the court need only consider the natural parent's rights.
150. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221 (1995).
151. See supra Part V.B.1.a.
152. See MAHONEY, supra note 79 at 142.
153. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order at 5-7, In re Custody
of A.R.A., No. DR 92-1200 (13th Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Aug. 10, 1994).
154. See id. at 8.
155. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221 (1995) (addressing only custody determina-
tions occurring after the death of the custodial parent).
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V. EFFECTS OF ERGER
By asserting that biology determines parental traits and
rights, independent of societal norms, the court avoids the difficult
task of identifying what constitutes a parent and the respective
rights that should attach to that status. 156 The court also evades
the issue of how to balance the sometimes conflicting rights of
children and their natural parents. The court assumes that absent
abuse, neglect or dependency, these rights always coincide. Erger
illustrates that this is not always true. Biology is relevant, and it
should be considered as a factor in custody disputes.157 However,
it should not be the deciding factor in a child custody case, as it
was in Erger.'"
As a result of Erger, the case law in a number of other family
law areas has been left unresolved.'59 For example, grandparents
remain entitled to seek custody of a child under section 40-4-211
of the Montana Code, and the best interest of the child standard
still determines custody."8 The court in In re Marriage of KE.V.
stated that the child should be awarded to a third party on the
basis of equitable estoppel without terminating either the natural
mother's or the natural father's rights. 6' This holding directly
contradicts the holding in Erger, which was explicit in its require-
ment that a third party not be allowed to obtain custody as
156. In much the same way that the court has used biology as an "incontestable
guide to gender difference-immutable biological traits that exist independent of legal
and cultural norms," it has also used biology as a screen in family law cases. Tracy
E. Higgins, By Reason of Their Sex: Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1551 (1995). By maintaining that biology is a justifiable
differentiation between men and women, the court could remain with its eyes closed
to gender discrimination. See id.; see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)
(finding that a law requiring only the unwed mother's consent to adoption was not
gender discrimination, because the mother necessarily developed a relationship with the
child, while fathers may or may not have a relationship with the child); Michael M.
v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding that women's
susceptibility to pregnancy is a valid justification for a law criminalizing intercourse
with teenage girls, but not boys); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (reasoning
that discrimination against "pregnant persons" was not discrimination against women).
157. For instance, children who are not living with their biological parents are at
a greater risk for abuse and neglect and receive less financial support than their
counterparts. See Woodhouse, supra note 82, at 1777.
158. As we have gained enormous control over reproduction and genetics, biological
conceptions of parenthood make even less sense. What logic is there in allowing the
courts to base fundamental rights in part on genetics when adoption, artificial
insemination and surrogate wombs are commonly used to facilitate parenthood?
159. See Erger v. Askren, 277 Mont. 66, 73, 919 P.2d 388, 393 (1996) (Nelson, J.,
concurring).
160. See, e.g., In re Custody of R.R.K., 260 Mont. 191, 859 P.2d 998 (1993).
161. 267 Mont. 323, 883 P.2d 1246 (1994).
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opposed to the natural parent prior to terminating the natural
parent's rights. However, the court did not directly overrule this
case. 62 Similarly, in In re Paternity of Adam, the court prevented
the biological father from establishing paternity or objecting to the
child's adoption because the court found that it was not in the best
interests of the child." In that case, the court did not even
address the constitutional rights of the biological father. Thus,
Erger v. Askren raises questions regarding the validity of this
precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court cases defining the rights of
children and parents within the context of family relations do not
require a near absolute protection of the natural parent's funda-
mental rights. However, in Erger, the Montana Supreme Court
held that any statute infringing upon a parent's rights prior to
termination of parental rights is unconstitutional. The court
dismissed the contention that either the child or the stepparent
may also have rights in need of protection. Consequently, the court
did not completely analyze the constitutional implications of
section 40-4-221 of the Montana Code. The court also failed to
recognize that the rights of all of the parties need to be balanced
to create equitable results. Instead, the court left the impression
that the only rights in need of consideration in custody disputes
are the rights of the natural parents. Such an impression is
dangerously narrow and jeopardizes our courts' ability to ade-
quately protect and serve the best interests of children.
162. See Erger, 277 Mont. at 73, 919 P.2d at 393.
163. See In re Paternity of Adam, 273 Mont. 351, 903 P.2d 207 (1995).
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ADMINISTRATIVE RULES of MONTANA - On CD-ROM
SEARCHING published ARMs is time consuming, tedious and often
unproductive. Searching on CD saves time, space and frustration.
Save Time: Search the entire set with one command. Powerful search
software lets you find the relevant rule with a simple word or number.
Save Space: Access the entire set of ARMs from a single compact disk.
Save Frustration: Forget about the burden and hassle of replacing pages.
Initial purchase: $395.00 Updated for only $50.00 per quarter!
MONTANA REPORTS - On CD-ROM
A Montana-based portable library extensively covering cases before the
Montana Supreme Court. The fast, easy search and retrieval system of our
CD-ROM can give a genuine advantage to lawyers, paralegals and
researchers requiring access to this information A five to one advantage in
time over researching with conventional law books. Updated Quarterly.
Initial year: $1570.00 Subsequent years only $540.00!
These progressive research tools are easy to use and so
inexpensive you'll be a hero to your clients.
Locate the information you need to WIN!
SState Reporter Publishing Company
P.O. Box 749 800\816-0636
Helena, MT 59624 406\449-8889
search@mt.net Fax: 406\449-4083
(Prices good through April 1998)
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